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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Eugene Ray Cobell appeals from the district court's order summarily dismissing 
his successive petition for post-conviction relief. The district court dismissed the 
petition, on the ground that Mr. Cobell's claim of ineffective assistance of prior post-
conviction counsel was not a proper basis upon which to file a successive petition for 
post-conviction relief. The district court erred. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Cobell was charged and convicted of rape and forcible penetration with a 
foreign object. 1 (R., p.22.) On June 5, 2008, the district court imposed concurrent 
sentences of life, with ten years determinate, on each charge. (R., p.22.) Mr. Cobell 
unsuccessfully appealed. (R., p.22.) He then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, 
which was dismissed on June 18, 2010. (R., p.23.) No appeal was taken from that 
dismissal. (R., p.23.) 
On July 28, 2011, Mr. Cobell filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
(R., p.3.) He asserted that his first petition was dismissed due to inadvertent omission 
of key claims and issues, including a claim of actual innocence. (R., p.4.) He further 
claimed that, due to a medical issue, he was incapable of committing the alleged crime, 
and this issue raised a "question of ineffective counsel to investigate, expose, and 
1 The record of the district court proceedings in Mr. Cobell's criminal case and his first 
post-conviction proceeding were never made part of the record in this case and the 
district court did not take judicial notice of such records. Accordingly, the procedural 
history cited in this brief comes from the State's Brief on Objection to Second Petition 
for Post Conviction Relief and Motion to Dismiss. 
1 
present this issue, and opens a gateway to other claims of legal malpractice by trial 
attorney." (R., p.8.) He also asserted that his petition alleged prosecutorial misconduct 
at both the trial and sentencing. (R., pp.9-10.) He specifically asserted that a 
successive petition could be used to "correct the manifest injustice of denial of ability to 
effectively file the first U.P.C.P.A." (R., p.15.) He concluded that he was trying to assert 
issues that he was not given a fair opportunity to present in his initial post-conviction. 
(R., p.18.) 
The State filed a brief which objected to the petition and moved to dismiss. (R., 
p.22.) The State asserted that Mr. Cobell's successive petition had not alleged any 
reason why grounds for relief were not raised in the first petition, and "to the extent 
Cobell's first petition challenged the validity of the district court's judgment the instant 
petition is barred by I.C. § 19-4908." (R., p.26.) 
The district court then issued a notice of intent to summarily dismiss the 
successive petition. (R., p.27.) The district court concluded, "the petitioner's sole 
argument that his claims were not adequately raised in his initial post conviction petition 
is that his post-conviction counsel was ineffective. However, because there is no right 
to post-conviction counsel, a petition based on ineffectiveness of post-conviction 
counsel is without merit." (R., pp.27-28.) Further, "[b]ecause the petitioner has not 
made any showing why the [sic] his claims were not previously raised, the Court cannot 
consider this petition." (R., p.28.) 
Mr. Cobell responded to the court's notice, but the district court summarily 
dismissed the petition for the reasons set forth in the notice of intent to dismiss. (R., 
pp.29; 32.) Mr. Cobell appealed. (R., p.34.) Because a claim of ineffective assistance 
2 
of prior post-conviction is a proper basis upon which to file a successive petition for 








The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Mr. Cobell's Successive Petition For 
Post-Conviction Relief 
A. Introduction 
In this case, the district court identified a sole basis for the summary dismissal of 
Mr. Cobell's successive petition for post-conviction relief: that a claim of ineffective 
assistance of prior post-conviction counsel was not a proper basis upon which to file a 
successive petition. Because both the Idaho Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have 
held to the contrary, the district court erred. 
B. The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Mr. Cobell's Successive 
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
1. Summary Dismissal Standard And Standard Of Review 
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that is separate and 
distinct from the underlying criminal action which led to the petitioner's conviction. 
Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 456 (1991 ). It is a civil proceeding governed by the 
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (hereinafter, UPCPA) (I.C. §§ 19-4901 to -4911) 
and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Peltier, 119 Idaho at 456. Because it is a civil 
proceeding, the petitioner must prove his allegations by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816 (Ct. App. 1995). However, the petition 
initiating post-conviction proceeding differs from the complaint initiating a civil action. A 
post-conviction petition is required to include more than "a short and plain statement of 
the claim"; it "must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the 
applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be 
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attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not attached." 
Id.; I.C. § 19-4903. "In other words, the application must present or be accompanied by 
admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to 
dismissal." Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 331 (Ct. App. 1998). 
Just as I.R.C.P. 56 provides for summary judgment in other civil proceedings, the 
UPCPA allows for summary disposition of petitions where there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
I.C. § 19-4906(c).2 In analyzing a post-conviction petition under this standard, the 
district court need not "accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, 
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law." Martinez, 
126 Idaho at 816-17. However, if the petitioner presents evidentiary support for his 
allegations, the district court must take the petitioner's allegations as true, at least until 
such time as they are controverted by the State. Tramel v. State, 92 Idaho 643, 646 
(1968). This is so even if the allegations appear incredible on their face. Id. Thus, only 
after the State controverts the petitioner's allegations can the district court consider the 
evidence. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612 (Ct. App. 1982). But in doing so, it must 
still liberally construe the facts and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the petitioner. 
Small, 132 Idaho at 331. 
If a question of material fact is presented, the district court must conduct an 
evidentiary hearing to resolve that question. Small, 132 Idaho at 331. If there is no 
2 Although this standard is set forth in section 19-4906(b), which deals with motions for 
summary disposition, it appears to apply to sua sponte dismissals as well. See, e.g., 
Small, 132 Idaho at 331 (discussing the standard for summary disposition under section 
19-4906 generally as being whether a genuine issue of material fact has been 
presented). 
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question of fact, and if the State is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, dismissal can 
be ordered sua sponte, or pursuant to the State's motion. I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c). 
Because evaluation of a motion for summary disposition will never involve the 
finding of contested facts by the district court, it necessarily involves only determinations 
of law. Accordingly, an appellate court will review a district court's summary dismissal 
order de nova. Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401, 402-03 (2006). 
2. Mr. Cobell's Claim Was Properly Presented In A Successive Petition 
The UPCPA provides that, generally, only one petition for post-conviction relief is 
allowed. I.C. § 19-4908. There is an exception, however, for situations in which there is 
"a ground for relief asserted [in a successive petition] which for sufficient reason was not 
asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended 
application." Id. Idaho's appellate courts have consistently held that the ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel is just such a "sufficient reason" for the petitioner 
to raise or re-raise claims through successive petitions for post-conviction relief. 
Indeed, on the issue of inadequately-raised claims, the Court of Appeals recently held 
as follows: 
A successive petition for post-conviction relief may be summarily 
dismissed if the grounds for relief were finally adjudicated or waived in the 
previous post-conviction proceeding. I.C. § 19-4908. Such grounds may 
be re-litigated, however, if the petitioner shows sufficient reason why they 
were inadequately presented in the original case. Id. Therefore, although 
a claim of ineffective post-conviction counsel, standing alone, is not 
grounds for post-conviction relief, an allegation that a claim was not 
adequately presented in the first post-conviction action due to the 
deficiency of prior post-conviction counsel, if true, provides sufficient 
reason to permit the claims to be presented again in a subsequent 
petition. 
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Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 441 (Ct. App. 2006) (emphasis added). In Griffin, the 
district court had summarily dismissed the petitioner's successive petition on the 
following basis: "It does not appear that any new issues have been presented .... 
[T]his Court hereby notifies the above parties of its intention to dismiss the application 
for post-conviction relief . . . because it is a successive application raising issues 
already adjudicated which is not permitted." Griffin, 142 Idaho at 440. Under these 
circumstances (and in light of the standard articulated above), the Court of Appeals held 
that the district "court's notice of intent to dismiss was insufficient or erroneous because 
the court did not give proper consideration to Griffin's allegation that his first post-
conviction action was dismissed due to the ineffective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel," and it vacated the district court's dismissal order and remanded the case. Id. 
at 441-42. 
Thus, it is clear that a claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel 
can present a sufficient reason to file a successive petition. The Idaho Supreme Court 
agrees. See, e.g., Palmer v. McDermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 596 (1981) ("[l]neffective 
assistance of prior post-conviction counsel, if true, would warrant a finding that the 
omission in the prior post-conviction proceeding of the allegations now being raised 
anew by [the petitioner] was not a result of an active, knowing choice made by [the 
petitioner] through his prior court-appointed attorney, and would therefore provide 
sufficient reason for permitting the newly asserted allegations to be raised in the instant 
petition."). 
In its notice of intent to dismiss, the district court articulated only one basis for 
dismissal. (R., p.27.) The district court concluded, "the petitioner's sole argument that 
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his claims were not adequately raised in his initial post conviction petition is that his 
post-conviction counsel was ineffective. However, because there is no right to post-
conviction counsel, a petition based on ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel is 
without merit." (R., pp.27-28.) Further, "[b]ecause the petitioner has not made any 
showing why the [sic] his claims were not previously raised, the Court cannot consider 
this petition." (R., p.28.) The district court cited Follinus v. State, 127 Idaho 897 (Ct. 
App. 1995), for this proposition. Follinus is inapplicable. 
In Follinus, the defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that 
his trial counsel was ineffective. Id. at 899. The district court summarily dismissed his 
petition and he appealed. Id. During the appeal, the defendant asserted that his post-
conviction counsel was ineffective. Id. The Court of Appeals concluded, "because 
there is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings 'a 
petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such 
proceedings."' Id. at 902 (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991 )). As 
such, "a denial of effective representation does not merit a remedy on appeal where 
there is no right to counsel." Id. at 903. 
The district court misapplied Follinus. Fo/linus applies where a petitioner seeks 
relief due to the alleged ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel. This is a 
separate issue from whether the alleged ineffective of post-conviction counsel can 
justify a successive petition, which Griffin discussed: " 
although a claim of ineffective post-conviction counsel, standing alone, is 
not grounds for post-conviction relief, an allegation that a claim was not 
adequately presented in the first post-conviction action due to the 
deficiency of prior post-conviction counsel, if true, provides sufficient 
reason to permit the claims to be presented again in a subsequent 
petition. 
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Griffin, 142 Idaho at 441. 
The law is clear that the ineffective assistance of post-conviction is just such a 
"sufficient reason" for the petitioner to raise or re-raise claims through successive 
petitions for post-conviction relief. Because the district court erred by concluding that an 
allegation of effective assistance of post-conviction counsel was not a sufficient reason 
to raise claims in a successive petition, this case must be remanded for further 
proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Cobell requests that the district court's order summarily dismissing his 
petition for post-conviction relief be reversed and his case remanded for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 29th day of May, 2012. 
JUSTIN M. CURTIS·. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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